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Abstract. Rank Quasi-Cyclic Signature (RQCS) is a rank metric code-
based signature scheme based on the Rank Quasi-Cyclic Syndrome De-
coding (RQCSD) problem proposed by Song et al. in [2]. Their paper was
accepted in the 22nd International Conference on Practice and Theory
of Public Key Cryptography (PKC 2019). They have also shown that
RQCS is EUF-CMA in the random oracle model. This short paper de-
scribes how to recover the secret key in RQCS with practical simulations.
Our experimental results show that we are able to recover the secret key
of RQCS in less than 41 seconds for all the proposed schemes at 128-bit,
192-bit and 256-bit security level.
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1 Introduction
Rank Quasi-Cyclic Signature (RQCS) is a rank metric code-based signature
scheme based on the Rank Quasi-Cyclic Syndrome Decoding (RQCSD) problem
proposed by Song et al. in [2]. Recently, their paper was accepted in the 22nd
International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public Key Cryptography
(PKC 2019). They have also shown that RQCS is EUF-CMA in the random oracle
model.
This short paper describes how to recover the secret key (x,y) in RQCS.
From a signature (g,u), we first recover a support basis for x and y from u1
and u2 respectively. Then, we recover a support matrix for x and y from the
public key (h, s). We show the result of the simulations of our attack at the end
of paper. The full version of our paper will be made available later.
Notation. Denote the rank weight of a vector as || · || .
2 RQCS Signature Scheme
Let H : Swr × {0, 1}
∗ → Ewg be a collision-resistant hash function, where
Swr = {e1 + h · e2 | e = (e1, e2) ∈ F
2n
qm st. ||e1|| = ||e2|| = wr}.
Ewg = {g ∈ F
n
qm | ||g|| = wg}.
Let a, b, c ∈ Fnqm and (·) : F
n
qm × F
n
qm → F
n
qm be the rotational product between
two vectors, satisfying
a · b = a [rot(b)]T =
[
rot(a)bT
]T
= b [rot(a)]T = b · a
where [rot(b)]
T
is the circulant matrix generated by b. By abuse of notation,
Song et al. [2] define (·) : F2nqm × F
n
qm → F
2n
qm as (a, b) · c = (a · c, b · c).
Now we describe the RQCS signature scheme.
RQCS.Setup: Taking the security parameter 1λ as input, it generates the public
parameters param = (n,w,wr , wg).
RQCS.Gen: Taking param as input, it chooses a uniform h ∈ Fnqm and (x,y) ∈
F
2n
qm such that ||x|| = ||y|| = w. It computes s = x+ h · y and outputs a pair of
keys (pk, sk). The public key pk is (h, s) and the private key sk is (x,y).
RQCS.Sign: Taking a private key sk = (x,y) and a message m as input, it
chooses a uniform r = (r1, r2) ∈ F
2n
qm such that ||r1|| = ||r2|| = wr. computes
I = r1 + h · r2 and g = H(I,m) with ||g|| = wg, followed by u = (u1,u2) =
(x,y) · g + r = (x · g,y · g) + (r1, r2). Then outputs the signature (g,u).
RQCS.Vrfy: Taking a public key pk = (h, s), a message m, and a signature
(g,u) as input. It computes I = u1 + h · u2 − s · g and outputs 1 if and only if
H(I,m) = g, ||u1|| ≤ wwg + wr , and ||u2|| ≤ wwg + wr.
3 Our Key Recovery Attack on RQCS
Recall that for a vector e = (e1, . . . , en) ∈ F
n
qm with ||e|| = w, there exists a
vector eˆ = (e1, . . . , ew) ∈ F
w
qm with ||eˆ|| = w and a w×n matrix E over Fq with
rk(E) = w such that e = eˆE. Note that eˆ and E are non unique. We call eˆ and
E satisfying e = eˆE as a support basis and a support matrix for e respectively.
We denote the support space of e, Supp(e) = 〈e1, . . . , en〉 as the subspace of Fqm
generated by the coordinates of e.
We extend the idea of [1, Algorithm 1] to solve for a support basis for x.
Given a = bC ∈ Fn−kqm with 〈cij〉1≤i≤n,1≤j≤n−k (of dimension d) known, the [1,
Algorithm 1] is to solve for b ∈ Fnqm with ||b|| ≤ r. In our case, we are given a
vector u1 = x · g + r1 = x [rot(g)]
T
+ r1 and a vector g with ||g|| = wg, we are
supposed to solve for x.
There are two parts in our key recovery attack on RQCS. The first part is
to recover a support basis for the vector x and y from u1 and u2 respectively.
The second part is to recover a support matrix for x and y from pk = (h, s).
Once we have recovered a support basis and a support matrix for x and y, we
can then recover the secret key sk = (x,y).
Step 1 - Recover a Support Basis for x and y.
Let Fx = Supp(x), Fy = Supp(y) and G = Supp(g) = 〈γ1, . . . , γwg 〉. We first
discuss the steps to recover a support basis for x from u1 = (u11, . . . , u1n) =
x · g + r1:
(a) For 1 ≤ i ≤ wg, compute U1i = 〈γ
−1
i u11, . . . , γ
−1
i u1n〉.
(b) Compute Fx =
⋂wg
i=1 U1i.
(c) Compute a basis {α1, . . . , αw} for x from Fx = 〈α1, . . . , αw〉.
Similarly, we can repeat step 1(a) to 1(c) on u2 = y · g + r2 to recover a basis
{β1, . . . , βw} for y.
Step 2 - Recover Support Matrices for x and y.
Recall that h · y = y · h = y [rot(h)]
T
. Now, let α = (α1, . . . , αw) and β =
(β1, . . . , βw) computed from step 1. Also, let R = [rot(h)]
T
.
We know that there exists X,Y ∈ Fw×nq with rk(X) = rk(Y ) = w such that
x = αX and y = βY . Substituting these two equations into s:
s = x+ h · y = x+ yR = αX + βY R. (1)
The linear system (1) consists of n equations over Fqm with a total of 2wn
unknown variables (from X and Y ) to be solved. Consider (1) under the base
field Fq, we have nm equations over Fq with a total of 2wn unknown variables.
Since the inequality m > 2w is always true in the construction of RQCS, we
have nm > 2wn, the number of equations is more than the number of unknown
variables. Then we are able to recover the matrices X and Y in polynomial time.
Simulations of Our Attack on RQCS. We consider all the parameters of
RQCS given in [2] and perform simulations of our key recovery attack. The
experimental results of our key recovery attack are presented in Table 1. The ex-
periments were performed using Magma V2.20-5 running on a 3.4 GHz Intel(R)
CoreTM i7 processor with 16GB of memory.
We experimented with all the three proposed parameters: RQCS-1, RQCS-
2, and RQCS-3. For each parameter, we measured the time taken (denoted as
“KRA Time”) to recover the secret key with our algorithm. The probability of
failure for our algorithm is denoted as “pf”. Table 1 presents the average timing
of 100 experiments for each parameter.
Instances (q,m, n, w = wr = wg) Claimed Security KRA Time
RQCS-1 (2, 89, 67, 5) 128 8.17 seconds
RQCS-2 (2, 121, 97, 6) 192 32.13 seconds
RQCS-3 (2, 139, 101, 6) 256 40.89 seconds
Table 1. Simulations results of our key recovery attack against RQCS
Our key recovery attack is able to recover the secret key of all the RQCS schemes
on an average time of less than 41 seconds.
4 Concluding Remark
We have proposed a key recovery attack to recover the secret key sk = (x,y) for
RQCS signature scheme. In fact, our attack can be considered as a full crypt-
analysis of the RQCS, in the sense that we do not attack only the parameters,
but also attack the structure of the system. More specifically, we can always
determine a support basis for the secret key x and y, due to the properties that
||u1|| ≤ wwg + wr and ||u2|| ≤ wwg + wr with g publicly known. Furthermore,
to verify the rank ||u1|| ≤ wwg + wr and ||u2|| ≤ wwg + wr, it is required that
wwg +wr < min{m,n}, which ensures the conditions of m > 2w for us to solve
for support matrices of x and y. In conclusion, RQCS is completely cryptana-
lyzed by our key recovery attack. Our key recovery attack is able to recover the
secret key of all the RQCS schemes on an average time of less than 41 seconds.
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